Citizen Journalism by Josh Mull

[The following is an essay written for Enduring America]

In Scott Lucas’s recent article “Mr. Obama’s War: The Fantasy of the Pakistan Sanctuaries,” he analyzes US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ appearance on Meet the Press, pointing out the cognitive dissonance in Gates’ assertion that the US understands safe havens in Pakistan because it has used those same Pakistani safe havens so effectively before. But Prof. Lucas also raises some very interesting questions, particularly over Gates’ apparent non-answer to host David Gregory’s question regarding the consequences of the US campaign to the Pakistani state. This is my attempt to answer those questions, as well as an attempt to parse out a broader US “grand strategy” from Gates’ appearance.

David Gregory asked Gates, “the trouble and consequences of jihadists making significant gains in either Afghanistan or Pakistan is perhaps more acute in Pakistan given its nuclear potential. True?” In reply, Gates’ offered this: “Well, as long as we’re in Afghanistan and as long as the Afghan government has the support of dozens and dozens of countries who are providing military support, civilian support in addition to us, we are providing a level of stability in Afghanistan that at least prevents it from being a safe haven from which plots against the United States and the Europeans and others can be, can be put together.”

The key is this: Gates isn’t answering the question about Pakistan to David Gregory. He’s answering the question about Pakistan directly to the Pakistanis.

I read that as “Well, as long as I can go on Sunday morning Prime Time and say 9/11, Taliban, Osama bin Laden and my Commander in Chief can draw crowds of 200,000 screaming Europeans, Pakistan can suck it up and deal with whatever we want to do, including destabilizing or overthrowing their corrupt government and/or stealing or destroying their illegal nuclear weapons, which by the way, I already have the authority to do from a little thing called the Lugar-Obama bill.”

In short, it’s not the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to keep Pakistan stable, it is his responsibility to attack extremist safe havens in Pakistan in order to prevent a catastrophic terrorist attack against the US, Canada, or the European Union. President Obama, and by extension the plans of his secretary of defense, enjoys bipartisan political support as well as stable international credibility, and accordingly, the US will act, as Prof. Lucas said in his article, as if “there are no consequences whatsoever for the internal Pakistani situation,” or more appropriately, without regard to these consequences.

But there is more we can glean from Secretary Gates interview than it appears. Beyond the purposes Prof. Lucas pointed out, pitching Obama’s Iraq withdrawal plan and articulating US Afghanistan policy, it’s possible Gates was offering us, and the international audience, insight into the broader strategic calculations of the United States, particularly the role the Department of Defense and US military power abroad.

President Obama has shown himself to be somewhat of a Centrist, if only in regard to his desire to hear from all sides of an argument or debate. One thing all foreign policy and national security analysts, from the Conservative “Fall of Rome” crowd to the Realist “Second World” type all the way to the Neoconservative “Team America” folks, can agree on is this: The United States of America is now and will continue to be Earth’s preeminent military force, at least for the foreseeable future.

There is a saying amongst foreign policy elites, always some paraphrase of “Who has the world’s largest air force after the US Air Force? The US Army.”

With Pakistan, Gates is essentially saying that, as long as the US, Canada, and Europe are threatened by extremist attacks from Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US will continue to act aggressively with its military force, in any manner and on any territory of its choosing, provided they have the support and cooperation from Europe and NATO (whose members will suffer from terrorism long before the US). What’s absent is any mention of India, implying the support of India in Afghanistan and protection from Pakistan-launched, “Mumbai-style” attacks are not part of the US calculation. (“Your problem, not ours.”)

It may seem like Gates casually forgot to mention India and Mumbai in his response on Pakistan, after all, “AfPak” is an extremely complicated subject and it’s easy to leave things out or get things mixed up. At least, that will be the talking point if this becomes an issue. However, we know two things: that India and Pakistan are inextricably linked together in any strategic calculus, and second, that this wasn’t just a casual visit to Meet the Press by Bob Gates. It was the public coming out ceremony for George W Bush’s former and now President Obama’s current Secretary of Defense, civilian leader of the United States Military.

The importance of this public appearance can’t be understated. It was not necessarily designed for the domestic audience of NBC viewers, but rather was aimed at a more global audience. As I noted above with Gates’ answer on Pakistan, he was answering it directly to the Pakistanis. And this is what makes the apparently deliberate absence of India from the “AfPak” equation so significant. The absence, the answer, and the entire interview together could lead us to presume that Gates is essentially articulating the prototype for what will later be called “the Obama Doctrine.”

The “Obama Doctrine” looks something like this: The United States will continue to use its military power as its premiere tool in international affairs, and may even act preemptively, however not on issues it deems outside of reasonable American national security concerns, and only with support and cooperation from the international community. To put it frankly, something like a cross between “walk softly and carry a big stick” and the Buddy System. While still violent, imperial and aggressive, it is a marked departure from the so-called Bush Doctrine and even the Global War on Terror.

The India-Pakistan(/Kashmir/Bangladesh) conflict is the perfect illustration. Under the old rules of the Bush Doctrine, the response to something like the Mumbai attacks might be airstrikes, special forces, or some other combination of clandestine military force. Under the “Obama Doctrine,” the Defense Department under Gates, and thus the US military, are not responsible for the India-Pakistan conflict. Rather this would fall under the portfolios of US Attorney General Eric Holder and his FBI as well US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her cadres of ambassadors and envoys, not to mention support and cooperation from that throbbing heart of diplomacy in Brussels (European Union), law enforcement agents with Interpol and NATO, and the mediation and oversight of the United Nations.

Obviously it’s an extreme departure from George W Bush’s radical Napoleonic-cum-Bolshevik strategy of the Global War on Terror, but that doesn’t necessarily mean the “Obama Doctrine” will turn out any more successfully than the Bush Doctrine. In fact, the strategy is brimming with vulnerabilities.

Sticking with Pakistan-India, though the US may be the most powerful military, it is not the only military on the planet. In the fall of 2007 as civil unrest was broiling in Pakistan under General Pervez Musharaff, then-Senator now Vice President Joe Biden campaigned in the Democratic Party primaries on a promise to pull strategic military aid from Pakistan, that is weapons used against India, in order to pressure Pakistan to focus on the insurgency rather than more ethereal, strategic conflicts. In response, however, the Chinese offered to sell Pakistan a new fleet of MiG fighter jets, similar to the American planes Biden was threatening to withdraw. Now, as then, there is a constant danger that any diplomatic “sticks” threatened by the US can simply be neutralized by other international actors willing to take its place.

Furthermore there is the problem caused by the global financial meltdown and the massive economic depressions its causing. While Secretary Gates may have in his authority to bomb Pakistani safe havens as well as police the Straits of Malacca, the United States may not ultimately be able to afford the high price of imperialism. And if the US is forced to cut back on its imperalist designs, it will create some extremely uncomfortable strategic questions for policy makers. For example, what is the higher priority between preventing a bus bombing in London or preventing a missile exchange between Korea and Japan when you can’t afford both?

But so we don’t end on such a morbid tone, let me point out that this prototypical “Obama Doctrine” has some very powerful advantages over the Bush Doctrine, the Global War on Terror, and the so-called Long War/Great Game theories. The most important advantage is that it is absolutely conscious of and constructed on the idea of a “Multi-Polar” world. That is even though the US seeks to dominate international affairs, it acknowledges and plans for the participation of other actors, state or non-state. By allowing for participation, it allows for competition, and as President Obama displays with his choice of Hillary Clinton for Secretary of State, competition has both winners and losers who can still join together for a common purpose. There is no absolute victory or defeat of good and evil, but rather a competition among partners.

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From TheRealNews:

Last year, when the time of renewing the United Nations mandate approached, Maliki cabinet and the Iraqi presidency went ahead and bypassed the Iraqi parliament, despite the fact that the parliament is the entity that has the exclusive constitutional authority over ratifying or approving the international treaties. This year, I think, the situation is different because the Iraqi parliament passed a resolution earlier this year, in May, stating that any United Nations renewal that doesn’t come back to the parliament is illegal and unconstitutional.

It may only be coincidence, but for the last few years, every time this particular vote comes up in the Iraqi parliament, talk of a coup against prime minister Nouri al-Maliki seems to peak. For instance, in 2006 after Maliki waivered before ratifying the UN mandate outside of the parliament’s authority, rumors began to circle that former regime elements might stage a coup. DemocracyNow had this:

I don’t think any of this could happen without American support, but I do know that there are a number of people inside the Baker commission, within the U.S. government, in the CIA and elsewhere, who are thinking about this. And just the other day, I spoke to Salah al-Mukhtar, who is a Baathist and former Iraqi official, who said that there are rumors all over Jordan that the CIA has been going around looking — the military going around looking for a general or two, who could take over in the event of a coup d’etat in Baghdad.

In August 2007, two months after Maliki passed on vetoing the parliament’s authority over international treaties, the rumors of a coup again burst into the open, even being speculated about on major cable news outlets. InformedComment offered this from private sources:

“There is serious talk of a military commission (majlis `askari) to take over the government. The parties would be banned from holding positions, and all the ministers would be technocrats, so to speak. . . [The writer indicates that attempts have been made to recruit cabinet members from the ranks of expatriate technocrats.]

The six-member board or commission would be composed on non-political former military personnel who are presently not part of the government OR the military establishment, such as it is in Iraq at the moment. It is said that the Americans are supporting this behind the scenes.

The plan includes a two-year period during which political parties would not be permitted to be part of the government, but instead would prepare and strengthen the parties for an election which would not have lists, but real people running for real seats. The two year period would be designed to take control of security and restore infrastructure.

Could the surge in rumors of a coup actually be US pressure on Maliki? Why do the rumors only surface during controversies surrounding the UN mandate, as opposed to the countless other scandals and errors that plague Maliki on a daily basis? The most interesting thing to note about all of these rumors is that they are all supported by the US, either overtly or through the CIA. While it’s highly unlikely that the US is actually spending the time and money to shuttle around the middle east and train mini-Iraqi juntas, it’s almost certainly a signal to Maliki that his status as favored son of the US is not guaranteed forever.

It’s pretty clear, however, that this time the US will continue to attempt to push the UN mandate through the approval process secretively and away from the oversight of the Iraqi parliament, probably even without resorting to overtly pressuring Maliki. With rhetoric between Iran and the US at its current escalation point, the US wouldn’t dare subvert the Iraqi constitution with a coup given that it may send a dangerous message to Tehran, that nothing is sacred in the battle for control of Iraq. Even rumors of a US-backed coup may fatally destabilize Maliki’s Shiite coalition, some of whom would gladly side with Iran over yet another Sunni police state.

Unfortunately, that does not mean Maliki’s position is entirely safe. Concerning a coup, Maliki had this to say to McClatchy’s in August of this year:

MALIKI: This is a sick mentality, a hangover, from the Baathist era. The era of coups has departed. Rule was through security and military agencies, but now the people rule. Coups were the distinguishing character of rule in the country and the people were excluded from the process. Now no one has the capability or the power to pull off an overthrow in this country and those who travel to the capitals of the world begging for support are delusional. This country will see no more such overthrows. The only possible overthrow is from within the constitutional democratic establishment. And if it were to be achieved through the parliament and the democratic political establishment then I am happy and it is welcome. Indeed I would cheer it on because for the first time we would have effected change through political means and not by weapons and tanks.

FADEL: But can the parliament really agree on anything?

MALIKI: So, then the government is safe. (laughter)

Essentially what Maliki is saying is that the parliament doesn’t need a coup to get rid of Maliki. They only need the political will to throw him out of office using legitimate constitutional processes. It’s almost certain that any replacement would be nowhere near as compliant as Maliki, and given his results, it could prove disastrous for the US effort. Worse yet, any major destabilization of the central Iraqi government, even if it is a normal constitutional process, could prove fatal. If that happens, the freshly ethnically cleansed Iraq may no longer be able to contain its civil war, whether US troops are present or not.

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From The World Next Week via Intellibriefs:

MIT Professor Nicholas Negroponte’s One Laptop Per Child (OLPC) social welfare organisation is hoping to ship 5 million to 10 million cheap laptops to developing countries this year. But the nonprofit organisation will struggle to lower the actual cost and increase the sales of its so-called ‘$100 laptop’ in the face of competition.

Negroponte’s original plan was based upon economies of scale. He expected the governments of developing countries to order millions of his cheap XO-1 laptops in order to cut manufacturing costs. The ‘$100 laptop’ currently costs $180 to buy, but almost $200 to make. But major electronics companies — such as Intel and Taiwan’s Asus Computer — befog the professor’s worthy vision: they are introducing similarly-priced rival laptops that will also deliver cheap computing to poor children, and turn a profit.

Judging whether the OLPC program was a success or failure lies in perspective. Certainly from Negroponte’s point of view it could be called a failure, but in fulfilling the larger aims of the program, that is “bringing internet connectivity to areas that currently lack telecommunications infrastructure,” time will no doubt show that OLPC was a resounding success.

Corporate enterprise may not have taken the lead on technology in the developing world, but the fact that they have shifted from undermining the OLPC to competing with it shows that the UN does have the power to reach humanitarian goals, even if that power is only bullying business into action. Certainly corporate enterprise would prefer a price war with the UN to more harmful practices like market planning and trade regulation, and with the right publicity, the UN would appreciate a new image as an innovator in humanitarian capitalism.

For more info on the OLPC – Laptop.org (official) – Wikipedia

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