Posts Tagged ‘insurgents’

Mr. Obama’s War: Secretary Gates and the “Obama Doctrine”

[The following is an essay written for Enduring America]

In Scott Lucas’s recent article “Mr. Obama’s War: The Fantasy of the Pakistan Sanctuaries,” he analyzes US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ appearance on Meet the Press, pointing out the cognitive dissonance in Gates’ assertion that the US understands safe havens in Pakistan because it has used those same Pakistani safe havens so effectively before. But Prof. Lucas also raises some very interesting questions, particularly over Gates’ apparent non-answer to host David Gregory’s question regarding the consequences of the US campaign to the Pakistani state. This is my attempt to answer those questions, as well as an attempt to parse out a broader US “grand strategy” from Gates’ appearance.

David Gregory asked Gates, “the trouble and consequences of jihadists making significant gains in either Afghanistan or Pakistan is perhaps more acute in Pakistan given its nuclear potential. True?” In reply, Gates’ offered this: “Well, as long as we’re in Afghanistan and as long as the Afghan government has the support of dozens and dozens of countries who are providing military support, civilian support in addition to us, we are providing a level of stability in Afghanistan that at least prevents it from being a safe haven from which plots against the United States and the Europeans and others can be, can be put together.”

The key is this: Gates isn’t answering the question about Pakistan to David Gregory. He’s answering the question about Pakistan directly to the Pakistanis.

I read that as “Well, as long as I can go on Sunday morning Prime Time and say 9/11, Taliban, Osama bin Laden and my Commander in Chief can draw crowds of 200,000 screaming Europeans, Pakistan can suck it up and deal with whatever we want to do, including destabilizing or overthrowing their corrupt government and/or stealing or destroying their illegal nuclear weapons, which by the way, I already have the authority to do from a little thing called the Lugar-Obama bill.”

In short, it’s not the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to keep Pakistan stable, it is his responsibility to attack extremist safe havens in Pakistan in order to prevent a catastrophic terrorist attack against the US, Canada, or the European Union. President Obama, and by extension the plans of his secretary of defense, enjoys bipartisan political support as well as stable international credibility, and accordingly, the US will act, as Prof. Lucas said in his article, as if “there are no consequences whatsoever for the internal Pakistani situation,” or more appropriately, without regard to these consequences.

But there is more we can glean from Secretary Gates interview than it appears. Beyond the purposes Prof. Lucas pointed out, pitching Obama’s Iraq withdrawal plan and articulating US Afghanistan policy, it’s possible Gates was offering us, and the international audience, insight into the broader strategic calculations of the United States, particularly the role the Department of Defense and US military power abroad.

President Obama has shown himself to be somewhat of a Centrist, if only in regard to his desire to hear from all sides of an argument or debate. One thing all foreign policy and national security analysts, from the Conservative “Fall of Rome” crowd to the Realist “Second World” type all the way to the Neoconservative “Team America” folks, can agree on is this: The United States of America is now and will continue to be Earth’s preeminent military force, at least for the foreseeable future.

There is a saying amongst foreign policy elites, always some paraphrase of “Who has the world’s largest air force after the US Air Force? The US Army.”

With Pakistan, Gates is essentially saying that, as long as the US, Canada, and Europe are threatened by extremist attacks from Afghanistan and Pakistan, the US will continue to act aggressively with its military force, in any manner and on any territory of its choosing, provided they have the support and cooperation from Europe and NATO (whose members will suffer from terrorism long before the US). What’s absent is any mention of India, implying the support of India in Afghanistan and protection from Pakistan-launched, “Mumbai-style” attacks are not part of the US calculation. (“Your problem, not ours.”)

It may seem like Gates casually forgot to mention India and Mumbai in his response on Pakistan, after all, “AfPak” is an extremely complicated subject and it’s easy to leave things out or get things mixed up. At least, that will be the talking point if this becomes an issue. However, we know two things: that India and Pakistan are inextricably linked together in any strategic calculus, and second, that this wasn’t just a casual visit to Meet the Press by Bob Gates. It was the public coming out ceremony for George W Bush’s former and now President Obama’s current Secretary of Defense, civilian leader of the United States Military.

The importance of this public appearance can’t be understated. It was not necessarily designed for the domestic audience of NBC viewers, but rather was aimed at a more global audience. As I noted above with Gates’ answer on Pakistan, he was answering it directly to the Pakistanis. And this is what makes the apparently deliberate absence of India from the “AfPak” equation so significant. The absence, the answer, and the entire interview together could lead us to presume that Gates is essentially articulating the prototype for what will later be called “the Obama Doctrine.”

The “Obama Doctrine” looks something like this: The United States will continue to use its military power as its premiere tool in international affairs, and may even act preemptively, however not on issues it deems outside of reasonable American national security concerns, and only with support and cooperation from the international community. To put it frankly, something like a cross between “walk softly and carry a big stick” and the Buddy System. While still violent, imperial and aggressive, it is a marked departure from the so-called Bush Doctrine and even the Global War on Terror.

The India-Pakistan(/Kashmir/Bangladesh) conflict is the perfect illustration. Under the old rules of the Bush Doctrine, the response to something like the Mumbai attacks might be airstrikes, special forces, or some other combination of clandestine military force. Under the “Obama Doctrine,” the Defense Department under Gates, and thus the US military, are not responsible for the India-Pakistan conflict. Rather this would fall under the portfolios of US Attorney General Eric Holder and his FBI as well US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her cadres of ambassadors and envoys, not to mention support and cooperation from that throbbing heart of diplomacy in Brussels (European Union), law enforcement agents with Interpol and NATO, and the mediation and oversight of the United Nations.

Obviously it’s an extreme departure from George W Bush’s radical Napoleonic-cum-Bolshevik strategy of the Global War on Terror, but that doesn’t necessarily mean the “Obama Doctrine” will turn out any more successfully than the Bush Doctrine. In fact, the strategy is brimming with vulnerabilities.

Sticking with Pakistan-India, though the US may be the most powerful military, it is not the only military on the planet. In the fall of 2007 as civil unrest was broiling in Pakistan under General Pervez Musharaff, then-Senator now Vice President Joe Biden campaigned in the Democratic Party primaries on a promise to pull strategic military aid from Pakistan, that is weapons used against India, in order to pressure Pakistan to focus on the insurgency rather than more ethereal, strategic conflicts. In response, however, the Chinese offered to sell Pakistan a new fleet of MiG fighter jets, similar to the American planes Biden was threatening to withdraw. Now, as then, there is a constant danger that any diplomatic “sticks” threatened by the US can simply be neutralized by other international actors willing to take its place.

Furthermore there is the problem caused by the global financial meltdown and the massive economic depressions its causing. While Secretary Gates may have in his authority to bomb Pakistani safe havens as well as police the Straits of Malacca, the United States may not ultimately be able to afford the high price of imperialism. And if the US is forced to cut back on its imperalist designs, it will create some extremely uncomfortable strategic questions for policy makers. For example, what is the higher priority between preventing a bus bombing in London or preventing a missile exchange between Korea and Japan when you can’t afford both?

But so we don’t end on such a morbid tone, let me point out that this prototypical “Obama Doctrine” has some very powerful advantages over the Bush Doctrine, the Global War on Terror, and the so-called Long War/Great Game theories. The most important advantage is that it is absolutely conscious of and constructed on the idea of a “Multi-Polar” world. That is even though the US seeks to dominate international affairs, it acknowledges and plans for the participation of other actors, state or non-state. By allowing for participation, it allows for competition, and as President Obama displays with his choice of Hillary Clinton for Secretary of State, competition has both winners and losers who can still join together for a common purpose. There is no absolute victory or defeat of good and evil, but rather a competition among partners.

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Is the US trading allies for security in Pakistan?

From BBC via Intellibriefs:

Mir Balaach Marri, alleged head of the banned Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), was killed in Afghanistan, Pakistani intelligence sources told the BBC.

Mr Balaach’s brother, Sardar Gazain Marri, said he had learnt of the rebel leader’s death on Tuesday evening.

“Some of his comrades informed me he had been martyred,” he told the BBC.

“I cannot disclose the location as it would further threaten the lives of those with him.”

Sardar Marri says he believes his brother was killed in an army operation in Balochistan.

“I believe there were a clashes in the province on Tuesday in which Mir Balaach was killed.”

However, intelligence officials in Pakistan told the BBC the rebel leader had been killed in Afghanistan.

They also declined to discuss the circumstances surrounding his killing.

Analysts say the killing could have been the result of a covert operation.

This story is especially intriguing because of the dispute over whether Marri was killed in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Pakistan has long insisted that the Baloch separatists are affiliated with the Taliban in Afghanistan (which also has a sizable Baloch population), and therefore they must be crushed. However, because the Baloch populations stretch from Pakistan all the way into southern Iran, and because they happen to be flush with natural gas and minerals, the US has long taken an interest in the BLA. In fact, it’s been widely rumored that the CIA, and possibly Mossad, have been actively aiding Baloch terrorist cells in southern Afghanistan and Iran. Of course Pakistani Intelligence insists that Marri was killed in Afghanistan, implying that he was there fighting for the Taliban.

Is it possible that, to facilitate and expedite Pakistani General Musharraf’s internal crackdown on opposition, the US gave the Pakistani military actionable intelligence against Marri, who may or may not have been our ally against both Iran and the Taliban? If so, it shows some lack of resolve on the part of the US Administration, given that the strategic value of an independent and capital rich Balochistan far outweighs the short term tactical benefits of an appeased Pakistani dictator. There is much to the story of Balochistan that remains to be told.

For more on Balochistan: Exiled Gov’t (semi-official) – SAAGBlueBlogginBalochWarnaMIPT

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Somalia the future home of AFRICOM?

From the New York Times via Nur al-Cubicle:

United Nations officials now concede that the country was in better shape during the brief reign of Somalia’s Islamist movement last year. “It was more peaceful, and much easier for us to work,” Mr. Laroche said. “The Islamists didn’t cause us any problems.”

Mr. Ould-Abdallah called those six months, which were essentially the only epoch of peace most Somalis have tasted for years, Somalia’s “golden era.”

For a quick recap of the situation in Somalia, Middle-East-Online has this:

US secret services have detected dangerous signs of “Talibanisation” in the traditionalist outlook of the UIC, such as bans on music, football, videos, and women working, and are keen to avoid the creation of a new Afghanistan in the region. They tried to buy some of the Somali warlords in February 2006. But the specially created Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism was unable to check the advances of the Islamist militias, who had won overall control of Mogadishu by July.

This new setback was followed by a bold move: There would be no repeat of Black Hawk, nor any US forces deployed on the ground, at least officially. Instead, with a mandate from Washington, the Ethiopian army marched into Somalia to support the TFG, which had been unable to take possession of its capital. By December 2006, the Ethiopian forces had removed the Islamist militias from Mogadishu.

The US army’s hunt for real or supposed members of al-Qaida continued. In January 2007, it undertook its first major operation, the machine-gunning of a group of “fugitives” by a heavily armed C-130 Spectre gunship, first used in the Vietnam war. Operations such as these, unscrutinised, in semi-secrecy, mark the return of a robust US stance in the secret war in the Horn of Africa. In February, special forces carried out operations in the south of Somalia and on 2 June, a US navy warship fired on targets near the port of Bargal in Puntland, which, it was claimed, were hideouts for “fugitive members of al-Qaida” — though these claims are unverified.

Raids against the jihadists have also increased in Mogadishu since the Ethiopians and President Abdullahi’s forces took control. Just being a former member of the UIC is sufficient grounds for being classified as a terrorist. Estimates of the number who have disappeared range from 200 to 1,000; they are believed to be being detained in the Villa Somalia in the port or in the National Security Agency’s underground cells. This augured ill for a reconciliation conference scheduled for June in Mogadishu. It opened a month late and lacked any participants from the Islamist groups and the Hawiye, the majority clan. It concluded on 30 August without any significant outcome.

It seems obvious at this point that Somalia under the leadership of the UIC was a far more stable and peaceful place than under the anarchy of the warlords. It begs the question of why the US would continue to fight the UIC when the islamists were able to pacify a country the US had so far failed to pacify itself. It’s not as simple as anti-islamic attitudes, as the US military has proved it will work with such elements if its strategically viable, notably in northern Afghanistan or Iraq’s restive Anbar province. Similarly, there isn’t much to gain from a determinately pro-Ethiopian policy now that the Cold War is over. One can therefore reasonably assume that the US has some strategic interest in seeing Somalia destabilized.

My personal theory is that this strategic interest is a future home for AFRICOM. When it was announced in February 2007, hot on the heels of an apparent UIC routing in Somalia, the US State Department had this to say:

The Defense Department is creating a new U.S. Africa Command headquarters, to be known as AFRICOM, to coordinate all U.S. military and security interests throughout the continent, the Bush administration announced February 6.

“This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa,” President Bush said in a White House statement. “Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa.”

Until now, U.S. military involvement in Africa has been shared among the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Central Command and the U.S. Pacific Command. Defense Secretary Robert Gates called this divided responsibility “an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.”

Creating AFRICOM “will enable us to have a more effective and integrated approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between [different regional commands],” Gates said February 6 before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

As the sharpened tip of the Horn of Africa, an AFRICOM in Somalia would have immense strategic value in protecting energy resources not only on the African continent, but also as a bolster to CENTCOM, Central Command, and their fledgling outposts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Together with Israel in the Mediterranean, the US would effectively lock down all energy sources west of the Black Sea. Short of South America, Russia and China will have only each other to look to for energy.

Basing AFRICOM has so far been a problem for the Pentagon; Most African countries want nothing to do with it, Nigeria being the latest. However, even with this opposition, Somalia is wide open. It’s pretty clear that most African governments, friendly or not, don’t want to allow US bases on their land. Quite simply, the US will need land with no government to allow it. That’s where an unstable Somalia is especially suited. Somalia doesn’t just have a weak government like Sudan or Libya, it has no government. It’s essentially anarchy. The TGF in Mogadishu is abysmally ineffective with no credibility, so much like the Taliban in Afghanistan, the US can claim that Somalia has no sovereignty to violate when we inevitably violate it. Learning its lessons from Afghanistan, however, means that this time the US will also wipe out any religious elements. This may actually severely weaken the legitimacy and credibility of any insurgency that’s likely to emerge once the US moves in. The US will install a friendly government and, again like Afghanistan, they will ask us to stay.

AFRICOM will have a home. Somalia will be pacified. While it’s true that this is essentially about energy security, and thus may seem to be a bit insensitive to the self-determination of Somalis, the introduction of massive, overt Western influence on Africa may have positive benefits in terms of opening up closed societies to free market prosperity and democratic institutions. The same could also be said for the current US enterprise in the Middle East. In both Somalia and the Middle East, however, no benefits are yet visible from US influence. Quite the contrary, actually. But, the Long War is just getting started.

For more on AFRICOM: OfficialWikipedia

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Josh Mull is Community Director for Small World News, and a contributor to Polizeros and Enduring America. He has been active in Citizen Journalism since 2007, specializing in community-based media for conflict- or disaster-affected states.