From Global Security via RFE/RL:
The foreign minister-in-exile of the separatist Chechen government, Akhmed Zakayev, has submitted his resignation.
Zakayev made the announcement amid a growing rift between the parliament-in-exile of the self-declared Chechen Republic Ichkeria (ChRI) and the separatist president and resistance commander, Doku Umarov.
In a video statement received by RFE/RL last month, Umarov declared the existence of a “North Caucasus emirate” and proclaimed himself the emir. That declaration prompted the ChRI parliament to state that Umarov had effectively relinquished his presidential powers, which now devolve to the parliament.
Zakayev told RFE/RL by phone from London today that until the parliament makes a decision on forming a new cabinet and appointing a new prime minister, he is not able to continue as foreign minister. “I think that everything that is happening in the state should have a legitimate foundation; everything should be done in compliance with the law, and in this case, I think that until the parliament forms a new cabinet of ministers, neither I nor the other members of the cabinet can fulfill their duties and professional obligations,” he said.
Zakayev said his resignation should not be viewed “as a departure from the fight for our independence, our freedom, and for the recognition of our state. By no means.”
“Chechnya at present is occupied, but it is not conquered,” he continued. “That’s why people today are waiting for an opportunity, but they haven’t accepted this situation by any means. I am absolutely confident that the Chechen people have good reason to think that soon in the future they will gain independence and live in a free, democratic country.”
It sounds like Zakayev is taking the only reasonable option and folding on his ministerial powers when there’s no constitutional authority. But Zakayev is referring to a separatist constitution - in exile, no less. His actions don’t strengthen the constitution, they effectively help dissolve it. As foreign minister for Chechen separatists, one could presume that Zakayev is neither foolish nor naive. It’s therefore reasonable to presume that Zakayev understands exactly what he’s doing.
The situation in Chechnya has been improving over the last few years, with Grozny airport officially taking flights in late 2006. But even saying that Chechnya is “improving” is a bit like saying Baghdad is better than Mogadishu. You’re dealing with extreme relativities. Make no mistake, Chechnya is still very much a war zone, much to the chagrin of Moscow. However, Zakayev’s resignation gives two major benefits to Moscow’s Chechen file.
First, the split in the separatist government is between secular nationalists and radical islamists. As long as the secular nationalist faction is folding up shop, it frees up Moscow to pursue the remaining Chechen rebels with the kind of brutal vigor only the Kremlin can muster. Russia has found that, post 9/11, the international community tolerates brutal crackdowns on islamist extremists more than it tolerates the same crackdowns on secular nationalists. Incidentally, China is closely emulating this very same technique in East Turkestan, cracking down on the Uieghur minority there.
Second, it very explicitly extends that wait-and-see message to other Chechen separatists. This message is based on the idea that if the separatists simply step back and allow Russia to defeat the muslim extremists, it will bow out quietly and gladly let the Chechens resume their march to independence. Of course, Moscow has no intention of abandoning Chechnya anytime soon, but this paradigm has been extremely effective in pacifying the nationalists. Zakayev’s comments, with his prestige, only strengthens this idea.
The more the US continues its drive towards Russia and Central Asia, the more Chechnya will become important. It’s unfortunate that US assets are so tied up elsewhere, as Chechnya would be an ideal theater for observing Russia’s counter-insurgency tactics and strategies, valuable intelligence for when the US and Russia’s interest in energy reserves inevitably overlap in Central Asia.
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